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Abstract
We consider an oligopolistic market where firms compete in price
and quality and where consumers are heterogeneous in knowledge:
some consumers know both the prices and quality of the products
offered, some know only the prices and some know neither. We show
that two types of signalling equilibria are possible. Both are charac-
terised by dispersion and Pareto-inefficiency of the price/quality offers.
But, better price/quality combinations are signalled with lower prices
in one type and with higher prices in the other type.
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1 Introduction
If there is competition between firms, then by the very nature of competition
the firms will compete in as many ways as possible, and not just in price.
Firms will choose such a combination of their strategic variables that it
serves their interests best. However, if consumers have similar preferences
and if they are fully informed about all relevant product characteristics,
then all these ways of competition may be expressed in terms of a one
dimensional competition model, essentially identical in nature to that of
price competition.
When consumer preferences differ, however, or when some consumers are
better informed than others, the competitive process involving many dimen-
sions does not have a single dimension analogue and should be analysed in
its own right. There are different approaches known in the literature dealing
with price/quality competition.1 The literature where firms make strategic
choices on quality can be divided into a literature dealing with consumers
that differ in the amount of information they possess (see, e.g., Chan and
Leland (1982), Cooper and Ross (1984) and Schwartz and Wilde (1985))
and a literature where consumers also have different preferences (see, e.g.,
Wolinksy (1983), Rogerson (1988) and Besancenot and Vranceanu (2004)).
Another dimension along which these models differ is the type of market in-
teraction considered. The above models either consider perfect competition
or monopolistic competition.
We address the issue of price/quality competition in a strategic oligopoly
model where quality is endogenously chosen and ask the following questions.
First, do firms differentiate themselves with different prices and/or quality
or do they make the same choices? Everyday experience suggests that we
sometimes face price and/or quality dispersion. How to explain price dis-
persion was first addressed by Stigler (1961). The importance of quality
dispersion was also emphasised, see e.g., Chan and Leland (1982). Second,
can price act as a signal of quality to consumers who somehow cannot eval-
uate it. From previous literature with exogenous quality we know that the
adverse selection problem can be mitigated if firms can signal quality choices
to the consumers on the basis of the prices they charge (see, e.g., Bagwell
and Riordan (1991)). Third, how should we characterise the outcomes in
terms of Pareto-efficiency? As in answering these questions we want to con-
centrate on the role of consumers having heterogeneous information, we take
their preferences to be identical.
We now discuss how we model information heterogeneity. Stigler (1961)
has pointed out that acquiring information about market prices is costly.
1Here we focus only on the literature where quality is a strategic variable chosen by
firms. Models with exogenous quality differences include Hertzendorf and Overgaard
(2001), Daughety and Reinganum (2004), Janssen and Roy (2007). This literature mainly
deals with the question whether price can signal quality in an oligopoly context.
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As consumers can have different search costs, different groups of consumers
can be present in a market: those who know all prices and those who do
not. This idea is central in Varian (1980).2 The idea also readily extends
to quality, e.g. in Cooper and Ross (1984) all consumers know prices, but
some of them are informed about quality while the rest is uninformed about
quality. We combine these approaches in the following way. As quality is
a more complex notion than price and so it is more costly for a consumer
to learn the right quality than to know the price a firm charges, there are
three groups of consumers in our model: those fully informed – they know
the prices and quality of the products in a market, those partially informed
– they know the prices but not the quality and those fully uninformed. We
emphasise the role of partially informed consumers. When they are present
in a market, price is not just an instrument of competition between firms,
but potentially also a signalling instrument. We analyse the consequences
of this informational scenario in a model where two firms choose price and
quality simultaneously and consumers buy one good at most. Alternatively,
firms choose quality first and then price, but are unaware of the quality
choice of their competitor before they have to make their price choices. It is
easy to see that this is formally equivalent to a simultaneous choice model.
We show that in this setting there can be an equilibrium characterised
by a dispersion of prices and quality such that price signals quality precisely.
This kind of correspondence between price and quality can be formally de-
scribed as a curve in a price-quality space. Consequently, the dispersion we
find we formally describe as a one-dimensional distribution of price/quality
offers over that curve. In such an equilibrium partially informed consumers
learn the true quality from the prices and so they act like fully informed
consumers. Second, we show that the equilibrium is always such that con-
sumers’ preferences over the resulting price/quality offers are monotone in
price: a consumer always prefers either the cheapest offer or the most expen-
sive one. Which particular equilibrium is to occur depends on how marginal
utility of quality changes with respect to price. If the marginal utility of
quality decreases when the price gets higher, arguably a common scenario,
then a consumer prefers the cheapest offer. Though the preferences over
equilibrium price/quality offers are monotone in price, equilibrium quality
need not be so, e.g. the quality may be worse for the average prices and
better for the small and high prices. Third, we show that price/quality
combinations offered in an equilibrium are Pareto-inefficient.
The paper is organised in the following way. Section 2 formally intro-
duces the model. Section 3 provides the equilibrium analysis. Section 4
gives an example that should illustrate the more complicated expressions of
2With this idea Varian partially follows Salop and Stiglitz (1977) who get informed
and uninformed consumers as a result of their model. Our model is closer to Varian in
this respect because both Varian’s and our model assume the presence of informed and
uninformed consumers as exogenously given.
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section 3. Section 5 concludes. The more technical proofs of propositions
are given in the appendix. In the text, we give less technical, more intuitive
explanations as to why the propositions hold.
2 Model Setup
We consider a market with two firms selling similar products. The firms can
decide both the price and quality of the product they offer. There is a unit
mass of consumers who choose between the firms so as to maximise their
expected utility given the information they have. The timing is as follows.
First, firms simultaneously decide on the price and quality of their products.
Second, each consumer decides from which firm to buy and whether to buy
the product at all. We will discuss the behaviour of the firms and consumers
in detail below.
2.1 Firms
The production technology is such that producing higher quality comes at
a higher cost. For simplicity we assume a linear dependency3 so that the
per-unit profits are given by
Π(p, q) = p− aq, (1)
where p and q stand for price and quality and the coefficient a > 0 charac-
terises the quality production technology. We take a to be the same across
firms. For simplicity we will also assume that the firms make their pro-
duction costs at the moment of sale, so there are no excess goods that are
produced but not sold.
Since the firms move simultaneously a strategy of either firm is simply
a distribution over all possible (p, q) bundles. To describe it let Pi and Qi
be the random variables that stand for the price and quality offered by firm
i and let Pi be the probability measure that corresponds to the strategy of
firm i. The chances that firm i plays, for example, a certain (p, q) bundle
are then given by P(Pi = p,Qi = q).
2.2 Consumers
We consider consumers that are homogeneous in their preferences with
the preferences being represented by a utility function U(p, q) defined over
price/quality bundles (p, q). All the consumers have the same reservation
utility UR. They all have unit demand and total demand is normalised to 1.
With two firms, consumers search for the best price/quality combination
– the one that maximises U(p, q). As explained in the Introduction, we
3A more general function, if it is concave, should deliver the same qualitative results.
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consider three groups of consumers: (i) fully informed consumers know the
prices and quality, (ii) partially informed consumers know the prices but
not the quality, and (iii) fully uninformed consumers know neither price nor
quality. These groups are referred to as H, M and L consumers, respectively.
The relative sizes of the first, second and third group are given by λH , λM
and λL with
1 = λH + λM + λL. (2)
A professional customer, who knows the firms and the product and hence
can check costlessly for the prices and quality offered would belong to the H
group. A new customer or a customer who lacks certain expertise to assess
the quality, but who can take his time to check for different price offers, will
belong to the M group. A person with substantially high alternative costs
of searching for a better price and quality would belong to the L group.
Consumers search for the best offer. H consumers know exactly what
the offers are and know how the utility from the best offer compares against
their reservation utility UR. M and L consumers search for the best offer
based on their expectations and so they can not judge how the offer they
select actually compares against their reservation utility, at least, during
the search process. We assume that each consumer can learn the price and
quality of the product at the moment of purchase.4 With this assumption,
if a firm chooses (p, q) such that U(p, q) < UR, no consumer will buy.
Let us now put the behaviour of the consumers into a more formal con-
text. To do so we discuss what the relevant information sets are, we discuss
the possible actions of different types of consumers and their resulting pay-
offs and we point out what strategies are sequentially rational.5
Recollect that the firms move first and they simultaneously choose their
(p, q) bundles and then the consumers search for the best offer. Let (pi, qi) be
the offer of firm i. A consumer of type H knows both offers in full detail, i.e.
he knows (p1, q1) and (p2, q2). An H consumer has three possible actions: to
buy from firm 1, to buy from firm 2 and not to buy at all. The corresponding
payoffs are U(p1, q1), U(p2, q2) and UR. Trivially, a sequentially rational
strategy is to choose the action that gives the highest payoff.
A consumer of type M only knows p1 and p2 but not q1 or q2. Conse-
quently, his information consists of all (P1, Q1) and (P2, Q2) bundles such
4This assumption is not crucial for our results. We focus on how consumers select
between the firms and on the resulting competition. We do not focus on mechanisms that
prevent the offers that breech the reservation utility from appearing on the market. So,
we make the least complicated assumption that partially or fully uninformed consumers
can learn the price and quality when they purchase. This is indeed true for the price. As
for the quality, assessment costs are arguably lower once it is possible, for example, to test
the good when being in the shop compared to learning the quality from an advertisement.
5See Kreps and Wilson (1982) for the definition of sequentially rational strategies.
Roughly speaking they are like subgame perfect strategies but also for cases where a
proper subgame can not be defined.
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that P1 = p1 and P2 = p2. We say that an M consumer has certain be-
liefs about the distribution of nodes in his information set. But we are not
interested in his beliefs directly, rather we are interested in the utility he
expects to get from either offer according to his beliefs. We use the notation
Uˆj(pi; p−i) to denote consumer j’s expected utility from the offer of firm i
given both the price of firm i and the price of its competitor, firm −i.
At this point an M consumer faces the following possible actions: go to
firm 1, go to firm 2, do not buy at all. The corresponding expected payoffs
are Uˆj(p1; p2), Uˆj(p2; p1) and UR. If he goes, say to firm i, he learns quality
qi. Now he knows what utility he will get if he buys and he can decide
whether to buy or not. The corresponding payoffs are U(pi, qi) and UR.
Trivially, a sequentially rational strategy is to choose in both decision nodes
the actions that deliver the highest (expected) payoff.
Consumers of type L are those consumers who just go to a shop and
buy if the product is not too bad for its price. L type consumers can be
loyal customers or people with sufficiently high search costs. To model their
behaviour we say that an L consumer can go to only one of the firms and we
assume that a half of them goes to firm 1. Once in a shop an L consumer
learns the price and quality of the product and he can either buy the product
or leave the shop. Trivially, a sequentially rational strategy for him is to
buy if U(pi, qi) ≥ UR.
For all consumers we assume that if they are indifferent between buying
and not buying they buy, and if they are indifferent between going to firm
1 and firm 2 half of them goes to firm 1 and the other half to firm 2.
The subsequent analysis is based on the assumption that utility function
U(p, q) is well-behaved.
Assumption 1. The utility function U(p, q) is strictly decreasing in p,
strictly increasing in q, strictly quasi-concave in (p, q), twice differentiable
in (p, q). Moreover, U(p, q) is such that the optimisation problem
max
p,q
Π(p, q) s.t. U(p, q) ≥ x (3)
has a solution for any x ≥ UR (in a sense, the utility function should be
sufficiently quasi-concave).
2.3 Equilibria
We concentrate on the role that prices have in signalling quality. In general,
a certain price may signal a specific distribution of quality.6 But we would
like to restrict our attention to a case where a certain price signals a certain
quality. This restriction, while still allowing us to answer the questions
raised in the introduction, considerably simplifies the mathematics of the
6This happens if firms play some mixed strategies over a region in (p, q) space.
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model. Also, for simplicity, we restrict our attention to symmetric equilibria.
Formally, we restrict our attention to equilibria that satisfy conditions 1-3
listed below.
Condition 1. The strategies of the firms are symmetric, i.e P1 ≡ P2.
Given this condition we will drop index i wherever appropriate.
Recollect that supp(P) ∈ R2 stands for the support of the distribution
that either firm plays, i.e. it gives all the (p, q) bundles that a firm may
possibly play according to its strategy. If we want a certain price to signal
a certain quality then we need supp(P) to form a curve in (p, q) space. We
thus have
Condition 2. supp(P) = {(p, q) : p ∈ [pl, ph], q = qˆ(p)}
In the above condition pl and ph are some arbitrary bounds and qˆ(p)
is some arbitrary function of p. Later we will see that for there to be an
equilibrium pl, ph and qˆ(p) have to satisfy certain conditions.
Finally, to avoid rather technical difficulties, we also impose
Condition 3. qˆ(p) is continuously differentiable in p over [pl, ph].
It is important to note that conditions 1-3 restrict the set of equilibrium
strategies. We impose no restrictions on off-the-equilibrium strategies, i.e.
a firm can deviate to playing any possible (p, q) bundles if it finds doing so
profitable.
We shall use
Definition 1. Function qˆ(p) is called an equilibrium curve.
and
Definition 2. A sequential equilibrium that meets conditions 1-3 is called
an exact signalling equilibrium.
By restricting our attention to exact signalling equilibria we essentially
focus on equilibria in mixed strategies. In general, when the above conditions
are not imposed, there are no pure strategy equilibria.7
This is a game with complete but imperfect information. So, we use
the notion of sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson (1982)). In short,
players’ strategies and beliefs form a sequential equilibrium if the strategies
are sequentially rational given the beliefs and the beliefs are consistent with
7The formal proof is given in Dubovik (2007). The reason for the non-existence of pure
strategy equilibria is essentially the same as in Varian (1980), namely that if a firm sticks
to sell a good of a certain quality for a certain price, its rival finds it optimal to offer a
slightly better deal for consumers.
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the strategies. As above we have discussed the sequentially rational strate-
gies of consumers, it remains to discuss the consistency of beliefs and the
sequential rationality of firms’ strategies.
To turn to the consistency of beliefs, recollect that Uˆj(pi; p−i) is an ex-
pectation of a partially informed consumer j about the utility that he gets if
he chooses to go to firm i. This expectation is consistent with the strategies
of the firms if it is computed under the probability measure that defines
those strategies. So,
Uˆj(pi; p−i) = E(max(U(P,Q), UR) |P = pi) ∀pi ∈ [pl, ph], (4)
where E denotes an expectation under measure P.
We take the maximum of U(P,Q) and UR because, once in a shop, a
consumer can choose not to buy if the realisation of U(P,Q) is smaller than
his reservation utility UR.
Equation 4 tells us that consistent beliefs are the same for all consumers
and do not depend upon the price of the rival firm given that these are on-
the-equilibrium beliefs, i.e. if pi ∈ [pl, ph]. In principle, off-the-equilibrium
beliefs may have a more general form but we restrict attention to beliefs
that have the same form as on-the-equilibrium beliefs:
Uˆj(pi; p−i) = Uˆ(pi). (5)
In an exact signalling equilibrium for any realisation of P there is a
unique corresponding realisation of Q = qˆ(P ). So, U(P,Q) = U(P, qˆ(P ))
and
Uˆ(p) = E(max(U(P,Q), UR) |P = p) =
E(max(U(P, qˆ(P )), UR) |P = p) = max(U(p, qˆ(p)), UR). (6)
for all p ∈ [pl, ph]. Equation (6) gives the consistency condition for beliefs.
Next, we turn to the sequential rationality of the strategies of the firms.
We begin by writing down the expected profits a firm gets if it selects a
particular (p, q) bundle and if its rival is playing an equilibrium strategy
(one that satisfies conditions 1-3).
Let µH(p, q), µM (p) and µL denote the expected number of H type, M
type and L type consumers that a firm gets if it charges (p, q) such that
U(p, q) ≥ UR. Given the sequentially rational strategies of consumers
µH(p, q) = P(U(P,Q) < U(p, q)) · λH + P(U(P,Q) = U(p, q)) · λH2 (7)
Indeed, all H consumers go to firm i if its (p, q) bundle gives higher utility
than that of the rival. In general, a rival plays a mixed strategy and hence
the chance to get all H consumers is given by P(U(P,Q) < U(p, q)). If both
offers give the same utility consumers split evenly.
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Next,
µM (p, q) = P(Uˆ(P ) < Uˆ(p)) · λM + P(Uˆ(P ) = Uˆ(p)) · λM2 (8)
Here the reasoning is similar to the one for H consumers. The only difference
is that M consumers do not compare the actual utilities they get from either
firm but rather they compare the expected utilities given the prices.
Finally, as was assumed,
µL =
λL
2
. (9)
Define, for convenience,
µ(p, q) = µH(p, q) + µM (p) + µL. (10)
Then expected profits are given by
pi(p, q) =
{
µ(p, q) ·Π(p, q) if U(p, q) ≥ UR,
0 otherwise.
(11)
As the firms choose simultaneously, a firm’s sequentially rational strat-
egy is simply a best response strategy. Choosing a (p, q) bundle over an
equilibrium curve qˆ(p) is a best response strategy if and only if the profit
function pi(p, q) attains its maximum along that equilibrium curve:
supp(P) ∈ argmax
p,q
pi(p, q) (12)
If (12) is not satisfied for a given strategy (for a given P), then the firm has
an incentive to shift the probability mass from less profitable (p, q) bundles
to more profitable ones.
Equations (6) and (12) give necessary and sufficient conditions for there
to be an exact signalling equilibrium. To have non-trivial results we make
the following additional assumption:
Assumption 2. The model is non-degenerate, i.e. there exists (p, q) such
that Π(p, q) > 0 and U(p, q) ≥ UR.
Since pi(p, q) ≥ µL · Π(p, q) if U(p, q) ≥ UR, a firm can always guarantee
itself some positive profits given the above assumption. So, in an equilibrium
no firm will offer (p, q) such that U(p, q) < UR because then it will have no
consumers and zero profits. Consequently,
Uˆ(p) = max(U(p, qˆ(p)), UR) = U(p, qˆ(p)) ∀p ∈ [pl, ph] (13)
We already know that in an exact signalling equilibrium U(P,Q) =
U(P, qˆ(P )). Using (13) then gives that
Uˆ(P ) = U(P, qˆ(P )) = U(P,Q) (14)
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This result allows us to rewrite µH and µM in terms of a common distribution
function. Let
F (u) = P(U(P,Q) < u) = P(Uˆ(P ) < u), (15)
dF (u) = P(U(P,Q) = u) = P(Uˆ(P ) = u), (16)
where dF is merely a notation. Then
µH(p, q) = F (U(p, q)) · λH + dF (U(p, q)) · λH2 , (17)
µM (p) = F (Uˆ(p)) · λM + dF (Uˆ(p)) · λM2 (18)
To summarise, there is an exact signalling equilibrium if and only if
(i) supp(P) ∈ argmax
(p,q)
pi(p, q), (19)
(ii) Uˆ(p) = U(p, qˆ(p)) ∀p ∈ [pl, ph]. (20)
Later on we show that in any exact signalling equilibrium U(p, qˆ(p)) is
strictly monotone in p. Therefore an exact signalling equilibrium is fully
characterised by its equilibrium curve qˆ(p), by the boundary points pl and
ph, by the distribution of utilities along the equilibrium curve, namely F (u),
and by its off-the-equilibrium beliefs, namely Uˆ(p) for p /∈ [pl, ph].
3 Analysis
In this section we solve for an exact signalling equilibrium, i.e. we solve for
F (u), qˆ(p) and pl, ph given U(p, q) and given the other parameters of the
model. At first we assume that there exists an exact signalling equilibrium
and we derive its properties. Later, we also discuss existence conditions for
an exact signalling equilibrium.
3.1 Utility Distribution
One of the functions that characterises an exact signalling equilibrium is a
CDF of utility over the equilibrium curve, namely F (u). In this section we
solve for F (u).
Recollect that F (u) = P(U(P, qˆ(P )) < u). Let us define
Uˆ(p) = U(p, qˆ(p)). (21)
Uˆ(p) is continuous in p because U(p, q) is continuous in p and q and qˆ(p) is
differentiable. Therefore Uˆ(p) maps an interval into an interval. This allows
us to define
[Ul, Uh] = Uˆ([pl, ph]). (22)
10
So, playing (p, q) bundles along an equilibrium curve results into the corre-
sponding utility being distributed over an interval.
We next show that F (u) does not have atoms.
Lemma 1. F (u) is continuous and dF (u) ≡ 0.
In economic terms, the chance that rivals provide the same utility level is
zero. the next lemma argues that Ul must be equal to UR. The main reason
is that the firm offering the worst utility only gets uninformed consumers
and if Ul > UR he could make more profit by providing them a worse deal.
Lemma 2. Ul = UR.
To find the functional form of F (u) we need to be able to define equilib-
rium per-unit profits as a function of utility (theorem 1 will clarify why this
is necessary). The following lemma allows us to do so.
Lemma 3. Given u ∈ [Ul, Uh] per-unit profits Π(p, qˆ(p)) are the same for
all p ∈ Uˆ−1(u).
To understand this lemma, take an arbitrary u from [Ul, Uh]. The iso-
utility curve corresponding to u is implicitly given by U(p, q) = u. This
iso-utility curve will intersect the equilibrium curve qˆ(p) at least once.8 If
{(pi, qˆ(pi))} is the set of intersection points, then {pi} is precisely Uˆ−1(u)
(recollect the definition of Uˆ). At each intersection point (pi, qˆ(pi)) we can
compute the per-unit profits Π(pi, qˆ(pi)). The lemma states that Π(pi, qˆ(pi))
does not depend upon a particular choice of the intersection point, it only
depends upon u. So, we use the notation Πˆ(u) for such profits.
Formally, take an arbitrary p˜(u) such that p˜(u) ∈ Uˆ−1(u) for all u ∈
[Ul, Uh]. Then
Πˆ(u) = Π(p˜(u), qˆ(p˜(u))). (23)
It is not possible to define Πˆ(u) explicitly as it involves choosing a par-
ticular p˜(u) and the functional form of U(p, q) is not given. However, once
a specific functional form of U(p, q) is adopted, and once qˆ(p) is known, it
is possible to choose a particular p˜(u) and hence solve for Πˆ(u).
The last step before we solve for F (u) is to simplify pi(p, q):
Lemma 4. For p ∈ [pl, ph] the profits are given by
pi(p, q) =
(
F (U(p, q)) · λH + F (U(p, qˆ(p))) · λM + λL2
)
·Π(p, q)
if U(p, q) ≥ UR and they equal 0 otherwise.
The result readily follows from lemma 1, from (20) (consistency of beliefs)
and from the definition of pi(p, q).
Now we can solve for the functional form of F (u).
8Later on we prove that only one intersection is possible.
11
Theorem 1.
F (u) =
1
2
· λL
λH + λM
(
Πˆ(UR)
Πˆ(u)
− 1
)
for u ∈ [Ul, Uh].
Proof. It follows from lemma 4 that
pi(p, qˆ(p)) =
(
F (U(p, qˆ(p))) · (λH + λM ) + λL2
)
·Π(p, qˆ(p)). (24)
Evaluating (24) at p˜(u), noticing that U(p˜(u), qˆ(p˜(u))) = u and using (23)
gives
pi(p˜(u), qˆ(p˜(u))) =
(
F (u) · (λH + λM ) + λL2
)
· Πˆ(u). (25)
For there to be an equilibrium the strategies of the firms should be sequen-
tially rational. This requirement was expressed in (19), we recollect it here:
(p, qˆ(p)) ∈ argmax
(p˜,q˜)
pi(p˜, q˜) (26)
for all p ∈ [pl, ph]. Therefore pi(p, qˆ(p)) is constant over this interval, denote
its value by pˆi. Since p˜(u) ∈ [pl, ph] we get
pˆi =
(
F (u) · (λH + λM ) + λL2
)
· Πˆ(u). (27)
By definition, F (Ul) = 0. Also, Ul = UR. So,
pˆi =
λL
2
· Πˆ(UR) (28)
Plugging it back and solving for F (u) gives the result.
It then follows that Uh is implicitly given by F (Uh) = 1. Using Theo-
rem 1 it may alternatively be given by
Πˆ(Uh) =
1/2 · λL · Πˆ(UR)
λH + λM + 1/2 · λL . (29)
3.2 Equilibrium Curve
The next function that characterises an exact signalling equilibrium is the
equilibrium curve qˆ(p). We solve for it now.
Theorem 2. If there is an exact signalling equilibrium then qˆ(p) has to
satisfy
dqˆ
dp
= −λH + λM
λM
· U
′
p(p, qˆ(p))
U ′q(p, qˆ(p))
− λH
aλM
everywhere on (pl, ph).
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Proof. It should be that
∂pi(p, q)
∂p
∣∣∣
(p˜,qˆ(p˜))
= 0,
∂pi(p, q)
∂q
∣∣∣
(p˜,qˆ(p˜))
= 0 (30)
because otherwise a firm may get higher profits by deviating along the gra-
dient vector. Using lemma 4 we get
∂pi(p, q)
∂p
∣∣∣
(p˜,qˆ(p˜))
=
(
F ′(U(p, q)) · U ′p(p, q) · λH+
F ′(U(p, qˆ(p))) · (U ′p(p, qˆ(p)) + U ′q(p, qˆ(p)) · qˆ′(p)) · λM) · (p− aq)+(
F (U(p, q)) · λH + F (U(p, qˆ(p))) · λM + λL2
)
· 1
∣∣∣
(p˜,qˆ(p˜))
=
F ′(U(p˜, qˆ(p˜)))
(
U ′p(p˜, qˆ(p˜))(λH + λM ) + U
′
q(p˜, qˆ(p˜)) · qˆ′(p˜) · λM
)
·
(p˜− aqˆ(p˜)) +
(
F (U(p˜, qˆ(p˜)) · (λH + λM ) + λL2
)
= 0 (31)
and
∂pi(p, q)
∂q
∣∣∣
(p˜,qˆ(p˜))
=
(
F ′(U(p, q)) · U ′q(p, q) · λH
)
· (p− aq)+(
F (U(p, q)) · λH + F (U(p, qˆ(p))) · λM + λL2
)
· (−a)
∣∣∣
(p˜,qˆ(p˜))
=(
F ′(U(p˜, qˆ(p˜))) · U ′q(p˜, qˆ(p˜)) · λH
)
· (p˜− aqˆ(p˜))+(
F (U(p˜, qˆ(p˜)) · (λH + λM ) + λL2
)
· (−a) = 0 (32)
From (31)-(32) it follows after some algebra that
dqˆ
dp˜
= −λH + λM
λM
· U
′
p(p˜, qˆ(p˜))
U ′q(p˜, qˆ(p˜))
− λH
aλM
(33)
What does the resulting qˆ(p) look like? Figure 1 gives the answer. It de-
picts an equilibrium curve, iso-utility curves and isolines of per-unit profits.
To see why an equilibrium curve has a shape as given in the figure,
rewrite the differential equation for qˆ(p) as follows:
dqˆ
dp
=
λH
λM
(
−U
′
p(p, qˆ(p))
U ′q(p, qˆ(p))
− 1
a
)
− U
′
p(p, qˆ(p))
U ′q(p, qˆ(p))
(34)
and recall that the line representing Π has a slope equal to 1/a. The slope
of the iso-utility curves is −U ′p(p,q)U ′q(p,q) . Therefore it follows from (34) that if
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Figure 1: Equilibrium Curve
p
q
pm
Π
qˆ
U = UR
A B
Notation: X stands for X(p, q) = const, where constant is arbitrary; X = X0 stands for
X(p, q) = X0, where X0 is some specific value.
the slope of an iso-utility curve is less than 1/a (point A, for example),
then the slope of an equilibrium curve is even smaller at that point and vice
versa. If the slope is exactly 1/a (point B), then an iso-utility curve and
an equilibrium curve are tangent to each other and they are also tangent to
an isoline of per-unit profits at that point. Therefore an equilibrium curve
relative to iso-utility curves should look as depicted in the figure.
According to lemma 2 the lowest attainable utility along an equilibrium
curve equals UR , thus the equilibrium curve in the figure “lies” on an iso-
utility curve that corresponds to U = UR.
3.3 Boundary Points
Earlier we have established a functional form of an equilibrium curve as
well as a distribution of (p, q) bundles over it. It remains to find out the
boundary points of an equilibrium curve, namely pl and ph. To address this
problem, let us refer to figure 1 once more.
An equilibrium curve spans [pl, ph], by definition. The figure shows that
a choice of [pl, ph] has important economic consequences: if [pl, ph] is located
to the left of the point of tangency pm then U(p, qˆ(p)) is decreasing in p, i.e.
lower prices signal higher utility. If on the contrary, [pl, ph] is to the right of
pm then U(p, qˆ(p)) is increasing in p and higher prices signal higher utility.
We find that both cases are possible depending upon the properties of
U(p, q), but that in both cases pm is the boundary point of the price interval.
We also formally show that U(p, qˆ(p)) is indeed decreasing in p in one case
and increasing in p in the other case. To state the main result, we need two
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definitions.
First, we formally define point (pm, qm):9
Definition 3. Let (pm, qm) be uniquely defined by
(pm, qm) = argmax(p,q):U(p,q)≥UR Π(p, q)
Lemma A.1 (appendix) shows that the point (pm, qm) defined in this
way belongs to the equilibrium curve qˆ(p) and that the equilibrium utility
U(p, qˆ(p)) attains its minimum at pm – just like it is in the figure.
Second, we define a contract curve in the usual way as a curve that
consists of all Pareto-efficient allocations in (p, q) plane:
Definition 4. Let
(p∗(x), q∗(x)) = argmax(p,q):U(p,q)≥xΠ(p, q).
Then, if there exists a function g such that q∗(x) = g(p∗(x)), we shall refer
to this function as a contract curve.
As, in principle, it is not necessary that g(p) is defined for every p, we
make the following technical assumption:
Assumption 3. A contract curve g(p) is defined in the neighbourhood of
pm and is differentiable at this point.
Now we can state the following theorem:
Theorem 3. If g′(pm) < 1a and if there exists an exact signalling equilibrium
then [pl, ph] = [pl, pm] and U(p, qˆ(p)) is strictly decreasing in p over this
interval. Hence in such an equilibrium higher prices signal lower utility.
If g′(pm) > 1a and if there exists an exact signalling equilibrium then
[pl, ph] = [pm, ph] and U(p, qˆ(p)) is strictly increasing in p over this interval.
Hence in such an equilibrium higher prices signal higher utility.
Theorem 3 tells there are two types of exact signalling equilibria with
equilibrium utility U(p, qˆ(p)) being monotone in p for either type. However,
the theorem says nothing about monotonicity of the equilibrium quality,
which is qˆ(p). It turns out that qˆ(p) is not necessarily monotone. Figure 2,
which illustrates a particular exact signalling equilibrium, gives an example
of a non-monotone curve.10
9This definition is valid. Indeed, the solution to the optimisation problem exists by
assumption 1. Moreover, the solution is unique because U(p, q) is strictly quasi-concave
by the same assumption.
10We used the following example to build the figure: U(p, q) = (q − 1)1/2(10 − p)1/2,
λH = 0.05, λM = 0.1, λL = 0.85, UR = 1 and a = 1. Section 4 gives another example and
shows how to solve for an exact signalling equilibrium. If to apply that procedure to this
example, one will get precisely fig. 2. However, this particular example we do not discuss
in detail as the computations are harder comparing with the example of section 4.
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Figure 2: Non-monotonic qˆ(p)
1.6
1.8
2
6 7 8 9 10
q
ppl ph
U = Uh
U = UR
qˆ(p)
Notation: U = u stands for U(p, q) = u.
If the marginal utility of quality declines as the price increases, i.e.,
if Uqp < 0, then g(p) has a negative slope and [pl, ph] = [pl, pm], so an
equilibrium where lower prices signal higher utility results.
Given Theorem 3 we can solve for the boundary points pl and ph. If
g′(pm) < 1a then ph = pm. As for pl, recollect that [Ul, Uh] = Uˆ([pl, ph]).
But Uˆ(p) = U(p, qˆ(p)) is strictly decreasing in p when g′(pm) < 1a , therefore
pl = Uˆ−1(Uh). (35)
Similarly, if g′(pm) > 1a , pl = pm and
ph = Uˆ−1(Uh). (36)
3.4 Existence and Uniqueness
In the previous sections we have uniquely determined all the parameters
of an exact signalling equilibrium (except for off-the-equilibrium beliefs).
Thefore we have the following theorem:
Theorem 4. There is at most one exact signalling equilibrium(up to off-
the-equilibrium beliefs).
Proof. To do the proof we merely have to recollect some of the results ob-
tained so far. (pm, qm) was uniquely defined in def. 3. qˆ(p) is given by a
differential equation of theorem 2 and it is known to go through (pm, qm)
(lemma A.1), (pm, qm) is thus the boundary point to uniquely solve the dif-
ferential equation. Depending upon the sign of g′(pm) we know that an
exact signalling equilibrium spans either [pl, pm] or [pm, ph]. In either case
U(p, qˆ(p)) is strictly monotone (theorem 3) and therefore p˜(u) is uniquely
determined by U(p˜(u), qˆ(p˜(u))) = u. In turn, p˜(u) gives us Πˆ(u) and Πˆ(u)
gives F (u) (see eq. (23) and theorem 1 respectively). Equation F (Uh) = 1
uniquely determines Uh and from Uh we can determine the remaining pl (or
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ph). Hence we can uniquely determine the parameters of an exact signalling
equilibrium, namely qˆ(p), pl, ph and F (u).
This theorem is silent, however, about the existence of such equilibria.
Now we want to address the existence issue.11 In the following sections we
present an example where an equilibrium exists and another example where
it does not. This leads to the question whether we can formulate parameter
restrictions guaranteeing the existence of an exact signalling equilibrium.
Since we consider a rather general U(p, q) and since pi(p, q) is derived from
U(p, q) in a rather complicated way it renders to be very difficult (if not
impossible) to provide such an existence result. However, we can address
the question of existence from a different angle: given an arbitrary equi-
librium curve qˆ(p), can we find such parameters of our model that there is
a corresponding exact signalling equilibrium, i.e. one that has qˆ(p) as its
equilibrium curve? Theorem 5 provides the answer.
We first have to discuss one basic requirement, though: an equilibrium
curve should allow for positive per-unit profits as otherwise there can be no
corresponding equilibrium.
Consider an arbitrary strictly increasing, strictly convex and twice differ-
entiable equilibrium curve qˆ(p) defined over some [pl, ph]. If we are looking
for a corresponding equilibrium where lower prices signal higher utility, then
pm = ph and, consequently, qˆ′(ph) = 1a . Hence, we know a and we can eval-
uate per-unit profits Π(p, q). If there is an equilibrium it should be that
Π(p, qˆ(p)) = p− aqˆ(p) = p− qˆ(p)
qˆ′(ph)
> 0 (37)
for all p ∈ [pl, ph]. Indeed, if the inequality does not hold for some p, then
some equilibrium per-unit profits are zero or negative and so are the expected
profits then. But zero or negative expected profits cannot be supported in
an equilibrium.
For a strictly increasing and strictly convex qˆ(p) equilibrium per-unit
profits Π(p, qˆ(p)) are strictly increasing in p over [pl, pm] and therefore (37)
is equivalent to
Π(pl, qˆ(pl)) = pl − qˆ(pl)
qˆ′(ph)
> 0 (38)
In a similar way, if we are looking for a corresponding equilibrium where
11The main issue here is the following. Note that for any given utility function U(p, q)
and given the rest of the parameters (λH , λM , λL and a) we can always find an equilibrium
curve qˆ(p), its boundary points pl and ph and the distribution of utility over that curve,
namely F (u). We also know that profit function pi(p, q) will be constant along qˆ(p) as
required. But none of the results obtained so far guarantees that pi(p, q) will attain its
maximum over qˆ(p) what is a necessary and sufficient condition for there to be an exact
signalling equilibrium.
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higher prices signal higher utility, it should be that
Π(ph, qˆ(ph)) = ph − qˆ(ph)
qˆ′(pl)
> 0 (39)
Given these two conditions we can state the theorem.
Theorem 5. Consider an arbitrary strictly increasing, strictly convex and
twice differentiable equilibrium curve qˆ(p) defined over [pl, ph] and satisfy-
ing (38) or (39) or both. Then there exist such a utility function U(p, q)
satisfying assumption 1, such parameters (UR, λH , λM , λL, a) and such off-
the-equilibrium beliefs that there will be a corresponding exact signalling equi-
librium, i.e one that has qˆ(p) as its equilibrium curve. If (38) is satisfied,
then U(p, q), (UR, λH , λM , λL, a) and off-the-equilibrium beliefs can be cho-
sen such that lower prices signall higher utility in the equilibrium. If (39) is
satisfied, they can be chosen such that higher prices signall higher utility in
the equilibrium. If both conditions are satisfied, both types of an equilibrium
can be achieved.
In other words, it may not be possible to have an exact signalling equi-
librium for any U(p, q), but at least there will be such equilibria for as many
different forms of U(p, q) as to generate every possible strictly increasing,
strictly convex equilibrium curve qˆ(p) that allows for positive per-unit prof-
its.
3.5 Pareto-efficiency
An allocation is Pareto-efficient in this model if an iso-utility curve is tangent
to an isoline of per-unit profits. But considering fig. 1, one can see that it
is not the case for any (p, qˆ(p)) with p ∈ [pl, ph). Therefore, equilibrium
allocations are almost surely Pareto-inefficient.
If there are no partially-informed consumers, the model simplifies to the
“Model of Sales” of Varian (1980) with prices being replaced by utilities.
I.e., it becomes a single dimension model and consequently all the equilib-
rium allocations will be Pareto-efficient. Therefore, the partially-informed
consumers and the incentives they create for firms to signal quality with
price is what brings Pareto-inefficiency. Fully uninformed consumers do not
create Pareto-inefficiency on their own, they merely create a redistribution
in welfare.
4 Example
In this section, we illustrate the nature of an exact signalling equilibrium by
considering an example. Take
U(p, q) =
1
2
ln q − p, UR = −2, λH = λM = 15 , λL =
3
5
, a = 1
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We begin by solving for (pm, qm). To do so we solve
max
p,q
Π(p, q) s.t. U(p, q) ≥ UR. (40)
and obtain
pm =
1
2
ln
1
2
− UR = 12 ln
1
2
+ 2, qm =
1
2
(41)
Next we shall select whether it’s an equilibrium where higher prices signal
lower utility or the one where higher prices signal higher utility. To do it we
need to know g′(pm). From (40) one can readily see that qm doesn’t depend
upon UR and hence contract curve g(p) = qm = 12 . Therefore g
′(pm) =
0 < 1a = 1 and we have to search for an equilibrium to the left of pm, i.e.
[pl, ph] = [pl, pm] (see theorem 3).
Let us now find qˆ(p). Plugging our utility and the parameters into the
differential equation for qˆ(p) (see theorem 2) gives
dqˆ(p)
dp
= 4qˆ(p)− 1 (42)
Solving it and using the boundary condition qˆ(pm) = qm gives:
qˆ(p) = e4p−8 +
1
4
(43)
To find utility distribution F (u) we need to know Πˆ(u) and for that we
need to find p˜(u) such that U(p˜(u), qˆ(p˜(u))) = u. Writing down this latter
expression gives
1
2
ln
(
e4p˜(u)−8 +
1
4
)
− p˜(u) = u (44)
A little bit of algebra gives the solution:
p˜(u) =
1
2
ln
(
1
2
(
e2u −
√
e4u − e−8
))
+ 4 (45)
Having (43) and (45) we therefore also have
Πˆ(u) = p˜(u)− aqˆ(p˜(u)) = p˜(u)− qˆ(p˜(u)) (46)
and
F (u) =
1
2
· λL
λH + λM
(
Πˆ(UR)
Πˆ(u)
− 1
)
=
3
4
(
Πˆ(UR)
Πˆ(u)
− 1
)
(47)
Given F (u) we can find Uh since F (Uh) = 1. Define
z =
1
2
(
e2Uh+4 −
√
e4Uh+8 − 1
)
(48)
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Figure 3: Equilibrium Characteristic Functions
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Notation: U = u stands for U(p, q) = u.
This way z ≤ 12 and F (Uh) = 1 can be rewritten as
1
2
ln z − z2 + 7
4
− 3
7
Πˆ(UR) = 0 (49)
This equation can not be solved analytically but a numerical solution is very
easy to get: z ≈ 0.08226. Then, from the definition of z,
Uh =
1
2
ln
(
4z2 + 1
4z
)
− 2 ≈ −1.43089 (50)
Finally, pl = p˜(Uh) ≈ 0.75109.
Figure 3 plots a few important functions of our equilibrium candidate.
The left plot gives qˆ(p) together with iso-utility curves that correspond to
Ul = UR and Uh. It is easy to see in the plot that higher prices signal lower
utility in an equilibrium. In other words, if a partially informed consumer
faces two products with different prices he will go for the cheapest product
and, though the expected quality will be lower, the expected utility will be
higher. The right plot gives the density function of the price distribution.
Earlier we exclusively worked with utility distribution F (u), but there is an
easy transformation as
G(p) = P(P < p) = P(U(P, qˆ(P )) > U(p, qˆ(p))) =
1− P(U(P, qˆ(P )) ≤ U(p, qˆ(p))) = 1− F (U(p, qˆ(p))). (51)
The right plot gives the density of this distribution, namely G′(p). From it
we can see that the lower prices, lower quality occur more often than the
higher prices, higher quality.
Recollect that pi(p, q) gives expected profits of one firm when the other
firm is playing equilibrium strategies. Therefore for there to be an equilib-
rium it should be that pi(p, q) attains its maximum along the equilibrium
curve qˆ(p). Figure 4 plots pi(p, q). The left plot gives 2D slices of pi(p, q) for
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Figure 4: Equilibrium Profits
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Comments: pc =
1
4
pl +
3
4
ph (the left plot); the bold line depicts pi(p, qˆ(p)), i.e. the
profits along the equilibrium curve (the right plot); also, for convenience, only a summit
of pi(p, q) is shown in the right plot.
various p, the right plot attempts a 3D presentation. One can readily see
that the condition in question is satisfied indeed and so we have an exact
signalling equilibrium.
Does an exact signalling equilibrium always exist? Not necessary. Con-
sider the same example but with λL = 15 and λH = λM =
2
5 . It can be solved
in the same way as before. Figure 5 gives the same plots as before but for
this new example. We know that if there was an equilibrium it should have
had the same pi(p, q) as we have found, but we have found pi(p, q) that does
not have its maximum along the equilibrium curve. Hence we can conclude
that there is no exact signalling equilibrium in this latter case.
5 Conclusions
We have considered a market where oligopolistic firms compete for con-
sumers by varying prices and quality of their products and where consumers
are heterogeneous in their knowledge of the prices and quality of the prod-
ucts offered: some know both the quality and prices, some know only the
prices and some know neither. We have derived a signalling equilibrium
for this setting that is characterised by firms playing a mixed strategy over
a curve in a price-quality space. We have shown that this signalling equi-
librium can be of two types. Both types are characterised by a dispersion
of prices and quality and by Pareto-inefficiency of the price/quality offers.
But in one type of equilibrium lower prices signal better price/quality ra-
tios, while in the other type higher prices signal better price/quality ratios.
Which type results depends on consumers’ preferences: the cheapest offer is
the best deal from a consumer perspective if the marginal utility of quality
is declining in prices.
21
Figure 5: Disequilibrium Profits
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Comments: pc =
4
5
pl +
1
5
ph and q
∗ is such that U(pc, q∗) = Uh (the left plot); the
bold line depicts pi(p, qˆ(p)), i.e. the profits along the equilibrium curve (the right plot);
also, for convenience, only a summit of pi(p, q) is shown in the right plot; the sharp spokes
to the back and right of the 3D picture are rendering artifacts – should a one steep “hill”.
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Appendix
Lemma 1. F (u) is continuous and dF (u) ≡ 0.
Proof. For u ∈ (−∞, Ul) ∪ (Uh,+∞) the cumulative distribution function F (u) is
continuous by definition. Consider now any point u˜ ∈ [Ul, Uh]. Suppose F (u) is
discontinuous at u˜. Then dF (u˜) is strictly positive, i.e. a positive probability mass is
assigned to an event {U(P,Q) = u˜}. This means that there is such (p, q) ∈ supp(P)
that U(p, q) = u˜. Consider a situation when a firm deviates from (p, q) to (p, q+0).
The expected number of partially uninformed consumers, µM , and that of fully
uninformed consumers, µL, will not change as they do not depend upon q. Per-
unit profits will not change as well since Π(p, q) is continuous in q by definition.
Consider µH . At (p, q + 0)
µH(p, q + 0) = F (U(p, q + 0)) · λH + dF (U(p, q + 0))λH2 . (52)
F (u) is a cumulative distribution function, therefore it has at most a countable
number of points of discontinuity. Therefore dF (u˜+0) = 0.12 As U(p, q) is strictly
increasing in q it holds that
U(p, q + 0) = U(p, q) + 0 = u˜+ 0. (53)
12In an ε-language the idea is to choose ε > 0 small enough and also such that
dF (U(p, q + ε)) = 0. Since the points of discontinuity can not cover an interval in full
however small it is, it is always possible choose such an ε.
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Hence,
dF (U(p, q + 0)) = 0. (54)
From the definition of F (u) and dF (u) it follows that
F (u˜+ 0) = F (u˜) + dF (u˜). (55)
Plugging (54) and (55) into (52) gives
µH(p, q + 0) = [F (U(p, q)) + dF (U(p, q))] · λH >
F (U(p, q)) · λH + dF (U(p, q))λH2 = µH(p, q). (56)
In section 2.3 we have shown that U(p, q) ≥ UR, so
pi(p, q) = (µH(p, q) + µM (p, q) + µL(p, q)) ·Π(p, q). (57)
Therefore pi(p, q + 0) > pi(p, q), what contradicts
(p, q) ∈ argmax
(p˜,q˜)
pi(p˜, q˜). (58)
Therefore the supposition was wrong and F (u) is continuous and dF (u) ≡ 0.
Lemma 2. Ul = UR
Proof. From lemma 4 it follows that the profits are given by
pi(p, q) =
(
F (U(p, q)) · λH + F (U(p, qˆ(p))) · λM + λL2
)
·Π(p, q). (59)
Consider p ∈ [pl, ph] such that U(p, qˆ(p)) = Ul. Such p should exist because Ul
belongs to the support of F (u) by definition. Also, by definition, F (Ul) = 0.
Therefore
pi(p, qˆ(p)) =
λL
2
·Π(p, qˆ(p)). (60)
Clearly, Ul ≥ UR. Suppose that Ul = U(p, qˆ(p)) > UR. Since Π(p, q) is strictly
decreasing in q and U(p, q) is continuous in q, it is possible to choose such ε > 0
that
U(p, qˆ(p)− ε) > UR and Π(p, qˆ(p)− ε) > Π(p, qˆ(p)). (61)
Also, F (U(p, qˆ(p)− ε)) = 0 and therefore
pi(p, qˆ(p)− ε) = λL
2
·Π(p, qˆ(p)− ε) > λL
2
·Π(p, qˆ(p)) = pi(p, qˆ(p)). (62)
This contradicts
(p, qˆ(p)) ∈ argmax
(p˜,q˜)
pi(p˜, q˜). (63)
So, Ul = UR.
Lemma 3. Given u ∈ [Ul, Uh] per-unit profits Π(p, qˆ(p)) are the same for all
p ∈ Uˆ−1(u).
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Proof. Take p ∈ [pl, ph]. Then it follows from lemma 4 that
pi(p, qˆ(p)) =
(
F (Uˆ(p)) · (λH + λM ) + λL2
)
·Π(p, qˆ(p)). (64)
If there are different p1, p2 such that
Uˆ(p1) = Uˆ(p2) = u (65)
then Π(p1, qˆ(p1)) = Π(p1, qˆ(p1)). Indeed, if this is not the case, then equilibrium
profits, i.e. the profits along an equilibrium curve, will differ between p1 and p2
as readily seen from (64). But profits have to attain their maximum along the
equilibrium curve (see (19)) and hence they have to be constant along it as well.
Lemma A.1. qm = qˆ(pm) and pm ∈ [pl, ph], i.e. point (pm, qm) belongs to an
equilibrium curve. Moreover, U(p, qˆ(p)) > U(pm, qˆ(pm)) for all p 6= pm, i.e. point
(pm, qm) gives the minimum utility among all the points of an equilibrium curve.
Proof. Let A = {p ∈ [pl, ph] |U(p, qˆ(p)) = UR}. This way A denotes the prices that,
together with their equilibrium qualities, provide the lowest possible utility. Set A
is nonempty as follows from the definition of Ul and from the result that Ul = UR
(see lemma 2). Pick an arbitrary p0 ∈ A. Let q0 = qˆ(p0). Since U(p0, q0) = UR we
have that F (U(p0, q0)) = 0 and therefore
pi(p0, q0) =
λL
2
Π(p0, q0). (66)
Consider now the following optimisation problem:
max
p,q
λL
2
Π(p, q) s.t. U(p, q) ≥ UR. (67)
Since a firm always attracts uninformed consumers while U(p, q) ≥ UR, the above
problem gives the profits the firm can always guarantee to generate. We know
that the unique solution to the problem is given by (pm, qm). Since the solution is
unique it should be that (p0, q0) = (pm, qm). Indeed, if (p0, q0) 6= (pm, qm) then the
firms could generate strictly higher profits by deviating from (p0, q0) to (pm, qm)
and then (p0, q0) wouldn’t be on an equilibrium curve, where it is by construction.
This proves the first proposition of the lemma. To prove the second proposition
it suffices to notice that since (p0, q0) is uniquely defined, set A consist of a single
point, i.e. A = {(p0, q0)}.
Lemma A.2. ddpU(p, qˆ(p)) > 0 for p > pm and
d
dpU(p, qˆ(p)) < 0 for p < pm.
Proof. For convenience let Uˆ stand for U(p, qˆ(p)) and let the same be for the deriva-
tives, e.g. Uˆp stands for Up(p, qˆ(p)) =
∂U(p,q)
∂p
∣∣∣
(p,qˆ(p))
Suppose dUˆdp < 0 at some point
p0 > pm. Utility function U(p, q) and equilibrium curve qˆ(p) are continuous by
assumption, therefore U(p, qˆ(p)) is continuous. Also U(p0, qˆ(p0)) > U(pm, qˆ(pm))
by lemma A.1 and U(p, qˆ(p)) is decreasing at point p0 by the above supposition.
Since p0 > pm we can then find p1 ∈ (pm, p0) such that
U(p1, qˆ(p1)) = U(p0, qˆ(p0)) and
dUˆ
dp
∣∣∣
p1
> 0. (68)
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Let us expand dUˆdp :
d
dp
U(p, qˆ(p)) = Uˆp + Uˆq
dqˆ
dp
=
λH Uˆq
λM
(
− Uˆp
Uˆq
− 1
a
)
(69)
where the expression for qˆ′(p) comes from theorem 2. Using the above to rewrite
dUˆ
dp
∣∣∣
p0
< 0 and dUˆdp
∣∣∣
p1
> 0 gives
− Up(p0, qˆ(p0))
Uq(p0, qˆ(p0))
<
1
a
and − Up(p1, qˆ(p1))
Uq(p1, qˆ(p1))
>
1
a
. (70)
Let us now consider an iso-utility curve that goes through (p0, qˆ(p0)) and (p1, qˆ(p1)).
It’s the same iso-utility curve because U(p0, qˆ(p0)) = U(p1, qˆ(p1)). Denote this
curve by q˜(p), i.e. q˜(p) is implicitly defined by
U(p, q˜(p)) = U(p1, qˆ(p1)) = U(p0, qˆ(p0)). (71)
This definition is valid since U(p, q) is strictly increasing in q and so there is only
one solution for q˜ in the above equation. For the same reason
qˆ(p0) = q˜(p0) and qˆ(p1) = q˜(p1). (72)
Differentiating (71) gives
dq˜
dp
= −Up(p, q˜(p))
Uq(p, q˜(p))
. (73)
Bringing together (70), (72) and (73) gives
q˜′(p0) <
1
a
< q˜′(p1). (74)
At the same time U(p, q) is strictly decreasing in p, strictly increasing in q and
strictly quasi-concave, therefore q˜(p) is convex, i.e. q˜′′(p) > 0. It shall follow then
that q˜′(p0) > q˜′(p1) since p0 > p1, but that contradicts (74). Therefore the earlier
supposition that dUˆdp
∣∣∣
p0
< 0 is wrong. Suppose now that dUˆdp
∣∣∣
p0
= 0. From (69) it
then follows that
qˆ′(p0) = −Up(p0, qˆ(p0))
Uq(p0, qˆ(p0))
=
1
a
. (75)
Also,
q˜′(p0) = −Up(p0, q˜(p0))
Uq(p0, q˜(p0))
= −Up(p0, qˆ(p0))
Uq(p0, qˆ(p0))
=
1
a
. (76)
Taking d
2Uˆ
dp2 , considering it at point p0 and plugging in the above expression for
qˆ′(p0) gives
d2Uˆ
dp
∣∣∣
p0
=
λH
λM
(
−Upp − 21
a
Upq − 1
a2
Uqq
) ∣∣∣
(p0,qˆ(p0))
(77)
Using (73) to get d
2
dp2 q˜, considering it at p0 and plugging in the expression for q˜
′(p0)
gives
d2
dp2
q˜
∣∣∣
p0
=
1
Uq
(
−Upp − 21
a
Upq − 1
a2
Uqq
) ∣∣∣
(p0,q˜(p0))
(78)
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But d
2
dp2 q˜ > 0 because iso-utility curves are convex, Uq > 0 because U(p, q) is
strictly increasing in q, (p0, q˜(p0)) = (p0, qˆ(p0)). Therefore d
2Uˆ
dp2
∣∣∣
p0
> 0. So, Uˆ is
strictly convex at p0 with dUˆdp
∣∣∣
p0
= 0. Consequently ∃p2 ∈ (pm, p0) : dUˆdp
∣∣∣
p2
< 0.
As was shown before this can not be the case and therefore the supposition that
dUˆ
dp
∣∣∣
p0
= 0 is also wrong. Summarising both arguments gives that dUˆdp > 0 for
p > pm. Analogues arguments give that dUˆdp < 0 for p < pm.
Lemma A.3. For any p 6= pm
∂2pi(p, q)
∂2q
∣∣∣
(p,qˆ(p))
=
a2λLλM
λH
· Πˆ(UR)
Π(p, qˆ(p))
1
2
Uˆpq − UˆpUˆq Uˆqq
Uˆq + aUˆp
+
1
Π(p, qˆ(p))

where Uˆp =
∂U(p,q)
∂p
∣∣∣
(p,qˆ(p))
and similarly for Uˆq, Uˆpq and Uˆqq.
Proof. We prove this lemma in a straightforward way. Recollect from lemma 4 that
pi(p, q) =
(
F (U(p, q)) · λH + F (U(p, qˆ(p))) · λM + λL2
)
·Π(p, q) (79)
with
Π(p, q) = p− aq. (80)
Distribution function F comes from theorem 1:
F (u) =
1
2
· λL
λH + λM
(
Πˆ(UR)
Πˆ(u)
− 1
)
. (81)
If we are to differentiate pi(p, q) we need to know qˆ′(p) and Πˆ′(u). The former
derivative we take from theorem 2:
dqˆ
dp
= −λH + λM
λM
· U
′
p(p, qˆ(p))
U ′q(p, qˆ(p))
− λH
aλM
. (82)
As for the latter derivative, recollect that
Πˆ(u) = Π(p˜(u), qˆ(p˜(u))) (83)
where p˜(u) could be any function such that U(p˜(u), qˆ(p˜(u))) = u. We’ll be looking
at the second order derivative of pi(p, q) at point (p0, qˆ(p0)) of an equilibrium curve
with p0 6= pm. For this point we can be more precise about p˜(u). Indeed, from
lemma A.2 we know that
d
dp
U(p, qˆ(p)) 6= 0 for p 6= pm. (84)
Also U(p, qˆ(p)) is twice differentiable because for U(p, q) it was assumed and qˆ(p)
is itself defined by a differential equation that involves only differentiable functions.
So, by an inverse function theorem there is a unique continuously differentiable p˜(u)
defined in the neighbourhood of u0 = U(p0, qˆ(p0)) by
U(p˜(u), qˆ(p˜(u))) = u (85)
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with its derivative given by
dp˜(u)
du
=
1
Up(p˜(u), qˆ(p˜(u)) + Uq(p˜(u), qˆ(p˜(u)) · qˆ′(p˜(u)) =
− aλM
λH
1
a · Up(p˜(u), qˆ(p˜(u)) + Uq(p˜(u), qˆ(p˜(u)) . (86)
Expressions (80), (81), (82), (83) and (86) allow one to calculate the second or-
der derivative of pi(p, q) in q in a straightforward way. Evaluating the resulting
derivative at (p0, qˆ(p0)), noticing that
p˜(U(p0, qˆ(p0))) = p0 (87)
and noticing that p0 was chosen arbitrary just not to equal pm immediately gives
the result of the lemma.
Lemma A.4.
Upq(pm, qˆ(pm)) +
1
a
Uqq(pm, qˆ(pm)) < 0 ⇒ [pl, ph] = [pl, pm],
Upq(pm, qˆ(pm)) +
1
a
Uqq(pm, qˆ(pm)) > 0 ⇒ [pl, ph] = [pm, ph].
In other words, either the equilibrium lies in the segment to the left of pm where
higher prices signal lower utility or the equilibrium lies in the segment to the right
of pm where higher prices signal higher utility (assumption 3 guarantees that the
case when Upq(pm, qˆ(pm)) + 1aUqq(pm, qˆ(pm)) = 0 can not happen).
Proof. Consider the case when Upq(pm, qˆ(pm)) + 1aUqq(pm, qˆ(pm)) < 0. Suppose
ph > pm. Then we can consider the limit of
∂2pi(p,q)
∂2q
∣∣∣
(p,qˆ(p))
as p approaches pm
from the right. To do so let us start with the limit of − Uˆp
Uˆq
. By definition of pm
and by lemma A.1
− Up(pm, qˆ(pm))
Uq(pm, qˆ(pm))
=
1
a
(88)
By lemma A.2
d
dp
U(p, qˆ(p)) > 0 for p > pm. (89)
Taking the derivative shows that this condition is equivalent to13
− Up(p, qˆ(p))
Uq(p, qˆ(p))
>
1
a
for p > pm. (90)
Moreover, − Uˆp
Uˆq
is continuous in p. Therefore we have that
− Uˆp
Uˆq
→
(
1
a
)+
as p→ p+m (91)
13See the mentioned lemma for more details.
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Hence
lim
p→p+m
∂2pi(p, q)
∂2q
∣∣∣
(p,qˆ(p))
=
lim
p→p+m
a2λLλM
λH
· Πˆ(UR)
Π(p, qˆ(p))
 1
2aUˆq
Uˆpq − UˆpUˆq Uˆqq
1
a −
(
− Uˆp
Uˆq
) + 1
Π(p, qˆ(p))
 =
+∞ (92)
The sign comes from the preceding discussion and from the observation that Πˆ(UR),
Π(p, qˆ(p)) and Uq are all strictly positive. But (92) contradicts the necessary con-
dition that ∂
2pi(p,q)
∂2q
∣∣∣
(p,qˆ(p))
≤ 0 for all p ∈ [pl, ph]. Therefore if there is an exact
signalling equilibrium it should be that ph ≤ pm.14 But pm ∈ [pl, ph] (lemma A.1),
hence pm = ph. Analogous arguments hold for Upq(pm, qˆ(pm))+ 1aUqq(pm, qˆ(pm)) >
0.
Lemma A.5.
Upq(pm, qˆ(pm)) +
1
a
Uqq(pm, qˆ(pm)) ≷ 0 ⇔ g′(pm) ≷ 1
a
Proof. Writing down the necessary conditions for the optimisation problem that
defines g(p) gives
− Up(p, g(p))
Uq(p, g(p))
=
1
a
(93)
Or, equivalently,
aUp(p, g(p)) + Uq(p, g(p)) = 0 (94)
Differentiating (94) in p and rearranging the terms gives
g′(p) = −Upp +
1
aUqp
Upq + 1aUqq
=
−Upp − 2 1aUpq − 1a2Uqq
Upq + 1aUqq
+
1
a
(95)
where Upp =
∂2U(p,q)
∂p2
∣∣∣
(p,g(p))
, etc. Consider now an iso-utility curve going through
(pm, qm). Namely, consider q˜(p) defined by
U(p, q˜(p)) = U(pm, qm) (96)
Twice differentiating this expression, evaluating it at (pm, qm), noticing that
q˜′(pm) = −Up(pm, q˜(pm))
Uq(pm, q˜(pm))
=
1
a
(97)
due to the definition of (pm, qm) and rearranging the terms gives
q˜′′(pm) =
1
Uq
(
−Upp − 21
a
Upq − 1
a2
Uqq
) ∣∣∣
(pm,q˜(pm))
(98)
14In this case we can not consider a limit from the right and the contradiction doesn’t
hold.
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Iso-utility curves are strictly convex (assumption 1), so q˜′′(pm) > 0. Also, (pm, qm)
belongs to the contract curve g(p), to the equilibrium curve qˆ(p) and to the iso-
utility curve q˜(p), so qm = g(pm) = qˆ(pm) = q˜(pm). So, we can use Upp(pm, g(pm)),
Upp(pm, qˆ(pm)) and Upp(pm, q˜(pm)) and the others interchangeably. But then the
statement of the lemma readily follows from (95), (98), from q˜′′(pm) > 0 and from
Uq(pm) > 0.
Theorem 3. If g′(pm) < 1a and if there exists an exact signalling equilibrium then
[pl, ph] = [pl, pm] and U(p, qˆ(p)) is strictly decreasing in p over this interval. Hence
in an equilibrium higher prices signal lower utility.
And vice versa. If g′(pm) > 1a and if there exists an exact signalling equilibrium
then [pl, ph] = [pm, ph] and U(p, qˆ(p)) is strictly increasing in p over this interval.
Hence in an equilibrium higher prices signal higher utility.
Proof. The formall proof is fully contained in lemmas A.1-A.5. Next we only give
a bit of explanation. For there to be an equilibrium, profit function pi(p, q) should
attain its maximum along an equilibrium curve qˆ(p) or otherwise the firms will
deviate from playing (p, q) bundles over it. The idea of the proof is to apply second
order necessary conditions to check whether pi(p, q) can indeed attain its maximum
over qˆ(p) given different choices of pl and ph. So, we need pi(p, q) to be concave
in the neighbourhood of each point of an equilibrium curve. In general we have to
consider a Hessian to check that but for this proof it suffices and it is convenient
to check concavity only in q, i.e. we look at the following second order necessary
condition:
∂2pi(p, q)
∂2q
∣∣∣
(p,qˆ(p))
≤ 0 for p ∈ [pl, ph]. (99)
Lemma A.3 provides us with ∂
2pi(p,q)
∂2q
∣∣∣
(p,qˆ(p))
. However, the expression is compli-
cated and it is hard to judge of its sign for an arbitrary p from [pl, ph]. But
important conclusions can be made when considering a limiting case with p→ pm.
Lemma A.4 tells that either [pl, ph] = [pl, pm] or [pl, ph] = [pm, ph]. What is the case
depends upon the sign of Upq(pm, qˆ(pm))+ 1aUqq(pm, qˆ(pm)). This latter expression
does not have an immediate interpretation but it can be rewritten as to allow for
an economic one. Namely, this expression can be formulated in terms of a slope
of a contract curve at pm, which is g′(pm). Lemma A.5 does so. Together with
lemma A.4 they gives: if g′(pm) < 1a then [pl, ph] = [pl, pm] and if g
′(pm) > 1a then
[pl, ph] = [pm, ph]. Finally, lemma A.2 gives that U(p, qˆ(p)) is strictly decreasing in
p for p < pm and is strictly increasing in p for p > pm.
Theorem 5. Consider an arbitrary strictly increasing, strictly convex and twice
differentiable equilibrium curve qˆ(p) defined over [pl, ph] and satisfying (38) or (39)
or both. Then there exist such a utility function U(p, q) satisfying assumption 1,
such parameters (UR, λH , λM , λL, a) and such off-the-equilibrium beliefs that there
will be a corresponding exact signalling equilibrium, i.e one that has qˆ(p) as its
equilibrium curve. If (38) is satisfied, then U(p, q), (UR, λH , λM , λL, a) and off-
the-equilibrium beliefs can be chosen such that lower prices signall higher utility
in the equilibrium. If (39) is satisfied, they can be chosen such that higher prices
signall higher utility in the equilibrium. If both conditions are satisfied, both types
of an equilibrium can be achieved.
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Proof. We only discuss how to find such parameters of our model as to get an
equilibrium where lower prices signal higher utility. Construction of an equilibrium
where higher prices signal higher utility is analogous. To prove the theorem we
have to find (UR, λH , λM , λL, a), U(p, q) and off-the-equilibrium beliefs such that
a) U(p, q) satisfies assumption 1, b) the resulting equilibrium curve is precisely
qˆ(p) and the resulting boundary points are precisely pl and ph, c) the expected
profits pi(p, q) attain their maximum over the equilibrium curve qˆ(p). We proceed
as follows. First, we choose some specific parameters (UR, λH , λM , λL, a) and we
choose a specific utility function U(p, q). Second, we show that a) and b) hold
for those parameters and utility function. Third, we choose some specific but
reasonable equilibrium beliefs and we show that c) holds as well. Take
a =
1
qˆ′(ph)
(100)
Consider ddpΠ(p, qˆ(p)):
d
dp
Π(p, qˆ(p)) = 1− aqˆ′(p) = 1− qˆ
′(p)
qˆ′(ph)
(101)
We asked for qˆ(p) to be strictly increasing and strictly convex, i.e. qˆ′(p) > 0 and
qˆ′′(p) > 0. Therefore qˆ′(p) < qˆ′(ph) for p < ph and, consequently, ddpΠ(p, qˆ(p)) > 0
for p < ph. In other words, equilibrium per-unit profits are strictly increasing in p
over [pl, ph]. Define
Πl = Π(pl, qˆ(pl)), Πh = Π(ph, qˆ(ph)) (102)
Take
λH + λM =
Πh −Πl
Πh +Πl
, λL = 1− (λH + λM ) = 2ΠlΠh +Πl (103)
We choose precise values for λH + λM and λL. As for λH and λM , they can be
chosen arbitrary but with λM sufficiently small, more precisely, we take λM such
that
λM <
(
Πl
Πh
)2 Πh −Πl
Πh +Πl
(104)
Trivially, λH = (λH + λM )− λM . Let
D = {(p, q) : p ∈ [pl, ph],Πl ≤ Π(p, q) ≤ Πh} (105)
To define U(p, q) and to show that it satisfies assumption 1 we proceed as follows.
First, we define U(p, q) for (p, q) ∈ D and we show that U(p, q) satisfies assump-
tion 1 on D. Second, we argue that U(p, q) can be extended beyond D in such a
way that the assumption is still satisfied. As a result we will have a utility function
U(p, q) that satisfies assumption 1 in general and has an analytical expression for
(p, q) ∈ D. Take
U(p, q) =
Πh
p− aq −
λM
λH + λM
Πh
p− aqˆ(p) −
λH
λH + λM
for (p, q) ∈ D (106)
and take UR = 0. Equilibrium curve qˆ(p) was taken to be twice differentiable, hence
U(p, q) is also twice differentiable on D as follows from its definition. Consider Uq:
Uq(p, q) =
Πh
(p− aq)2 · a > 0 (107)
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Hence, U(p, q) is strictly increasing in q. Next, consider Up:
Up(p, q) = − Πh(p− aq)2 +
λM
λM + λH
Πh
(p− aqˆ(p))2 (1− aqˆ
′(p)) (108)
For (p, q) ∈ D it holds that
p− aq ≤ Πh, p− aqˆ(p) ≥ Πl, 0 ≤ qˆ′(p) ≤ 1
a
(109)
Therefore
Up(p, q) ≤ −ΠhΠ2h
+
λM
λM + λH
Πh
Π2l
< 0, (110)
where the last inequality follows directly from (103) and (104). Hence, U(p, q) is
strictly decreasing in p on D. If U(p, q) is strictly decreasing in p and strictly
increasing in q then it is strictly quasi-concave if and only if its iso-utility curves
q˜(p) are strictly convex, i.e. it should be that q˜′′(p) > 0. To check that q˜′′(p) > 0
we start with q˜′(p):
q˜′(p) = −Up(p, q˜(p))
Uq(p, q˜(p))
=
1
a
− 1
a
λM
λM + λH
(p− aq˜(p))2
(p− aqˆ(p))2 (1− aqˆ
′(p)) (111)
Next,
q˜′′(p) =
2
a
λM
λM + λH
(p− aq˜(p))2(1− aqˆ′(p))2
(p− aqˆ(p))3
(
1− λM
λM + λH
p− aq˜(p)
p− aqˆ(p)
)
+
λM
λM + λH
(p− aq˜(p))2
(p− aqˆ(p))2 qˆ
′′(p) (112)
Equilibrium curve qˆ(p) was taken to be strictly convex, so qˆ′′(p) > 0. Also, on D,
p− aq˜(p) ≤ Πh, p− aqˆ(p) ≥ Πl (113)
and then
1− λM
λM + λH
p− aq˜(p)
p− aqˆ(p) ≥ 1−
λM
λM + λH
Πh
Πl
> 1− Πl
Πh
> 0, (114)
where the second inequality follows directly from (103) and (104). Consequently,
q˜′′(p) > 0 and U(p, q) is strictly quasi-concave. Consider U(p, q) as a map of iso-
utility curves on D. These iso-utility curves, when viewed as functions of p, are
strictly increasing, strictly convex and are as sufficiently smooth as to make U(p, q)
twice differentiable. Also, D is a convex set. Clearly then, these iso-utility curves
can be extended beyond D as to still be strictly increasing, strictly convex and
sufficiently smooth. Moreover, these iso-utility curves can be made convex enough
outside D so as to have each of them attain a slope of 1a at some point. This latter
condition guarantees that max(p,q)Π(p, q) s.t. U(p, q) ≥ x has an inner solution.
Summarising, there exists a utility function U(p, q) satisfying assumption 1 and for
(p, q) ∈ D being explicitly defined by (106). We take such a U(p, q) as our utility
function. Now we proceed with verifying b). Given (UR, λH , λM , λL, a) and
given U(p, q) we can solve for the equilibrium curve and for the boundary points.
32
We denote the equilibrium curve and the boundary points that we get as a solution
to the model by qˆs(p) and by psl , p
s
h respectively, this way we can distinguish them
from the given qˆ(p) and pl, ph. Then to verify b) means to verify that qˆs(p) ≡ qˆ(p),
psl = pl and p
s
h = ph. In general, [p
s
l , p
s
h] = [p
s
l , pm] in equilibria where lower prices
signal higher utility – see theorem 3. In our case we are also looking for such an
equilibria, hence we also choose psh = pm.
15 Recollect that
(pm, qm) = argmax
p,q
Π(p, q) s.t. U(p, q) ≥ UR (115)
Utility U(p, q) strictly increases in q and strictly decreases in p, per-unit profits
Π(p, q) do just the opposite. Therefore, the solution is attained when U(p, q) = UR
and the first-order conditions for this optimisation problem are:
Πp(p, q)
Πq(p, q)
=
Up(p, q)
Uq(p, q)
,
U(p, q) = UR.
(116)
Suppose optimal (p, q) ∈ D. Then using (106) and simplifying gives:
1− aqˆ′(p) = 0,
Πh
p− aq −
λM
λH + λM
Πh
p− aqˆ(p) −
λH
λH + λM
= 0.
(117)
Given that a = 1qˆ′(ph) and that Πh = ph−aqˆ(ph) it is straightforward to verify that
point (ph, qˆ(ph)) satisfies (117). Moreover, from assumption 1 it follows that there
is a unique solution to the considered optimisation problem, therefore (ph, qˆ(ph)) is
this unique solution. So, (pm, qm) = (ph, qˆ(ph)) and psh = ph. From theorem 2
qˆ′s(p) = −
λH + λM
λM
Up(p, qˆs(p))
Uq(p, qˆs(p))
− 1
a
λH
λM
(118)
The boundary condition comes from lemma A.1: qˆs(p) has to go through the point
(pm, qm) = (ph, qˆ(ph)). For p ∈ [pl, ph] we use (108) and (107) to rewrite (118) as
qˆ′s(p) =
1
a
− 1
a
(
p− aqˆs(p)
p− aqˆ(p)
)
(1− aqˆ′(p)) (119)
Clearly, for p ∈ [pl, ph] qˆs(p) ≡ qˆ(p) is a solution. Moreover, it is unique by the
Picard’s theorem. We can not say what qˆs(p) is for p /∈ [pl, ph], but as we will
see later on this is not required. The lower bound psl is implicitly defined by
U(psl , qˆs(p
s
l )) = Uh and Uh comes from F (Uh) = 1. We now solve these equations.
For p ∈ [pl, ph]
U(p, qˆs(p)) = U(p, qˆ(p)) =
λH
λH + λM
(
Πh
p− aqˆ(p) − 1
)
(120)
15This is a subtle point. In our case utility function U(p, q), as defined in (106), violates
assumption 3, therefore theorem 3 can not be applied. Consequently, there is no immediate
restriction on the choice of psh: we are free to choose p
s
h = pm, but other choices are also
possible. Such a utility function is a special case, however. It is possible to perturb the
suggested U(p, q) a bit in such a way that the current theorem still holds, assumption 3
is not violated and theorem 3 dictates a unique choice of psh, namely p
s
h = pm. See the
following discussion on profits and footnote 17 for a brief explanation on how to do it.
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From theorem 1
F (u) =
1
2
λL
λH + λM
(
Πh
Πˆ(u)
− 1
)
, (121)
where
Πˆ(u) = p˜(u)− aqˆ(p˜(u)) (122)
and p˜(u) is implicitly defined by
U(p˜(u), qˆ(p˜(u))) = u. (123)
Substituting p with p˜(u) in (120) and the resulting p˜(u)− aqˆ(p˜(u)) with Πˆ(u) and
then comparing the outcome with (121) gives
F (u) =
1
2
λL
λH
· u (124)
Hence Uh = 2λHλL . Suppose p
s
l ∈ [pl, ph], then using (103) and (104) we can rewrite
U(psl , qˆ(p
s
l )) = Uh as
psl − aqˆ(psl ) = Πl = pl − aqˆ(pl) (125)
Clearly then, psl = pl is a solution. Moreover, it is unique because U(p, qˆ(p)) is
strictly monotone in p (lemma A.2). Next, we have to verify c), i.e. we have to
verify that the expected profits pi(p, q) attain their maximum over qˆ(p). When the
opponent is playing the equilibrium strategy
pi(p, q) =
(
F (U(p, q)) · λH + F (Uˆ(p)) · λM + λL2
)
Π(p, q), (126)
where Uˆ(p) stands for the utility that partially informed consumers expect to receive
given that the price is p. For p ∈ [pl, ph] we have that
Uˆ(p) = U(p, qˆs(p)) = U(p, qˆ(p)). (127)
Since U(p, qˆ(p)) is strictly decreasing in p for p ∈ [pl, ph] we can choose and we
choose such off-the-equilibrium beliefs that Uˆ(p) is decreasing in p for p ∈ R.16
Define
SC = {(p, q) : p ∈ [pl, ph], UR ≤ U(p, q) ≤ Uh}, (128)
SB = {(p, q) : U(p, q) < UR}, (129)
SL = {(p, q) : p < pl, UR ≤ U(p, q) ≤ Uh}, (130)
SR = {(p, q) : p > ph, UR ≤ U(p, q) ≤ Uh}, (131)
ST = {(p, q) : U(p, q) > Uh}. (132)
Clearly,
⋃
x Sx = R2. We consider pi(p, q) over each of these regions in turn. First,
suppose (p, q) ∈ SC . For p ∈ [pl, ph] it holds that Πl ≤ p−aqˆ(p) ≤ Πh. Then, using
the definitions for λH + λM and λL, it is straightforward to verify that
U(p, q) ≥ UR ⇒ Π(p, q) ≤ Πh, (133)
U(p, q) ≤ Uh ⇒ Π(p, q) ≥ Πl. (134)
16These are reasonable off-the-equilibrium beliefs as they depend upon p in the same
direction as on-the-equilibrium beliefs do.
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Consequently, SC ⊆ D. But for (p, q) ∈ D we have an explicit expression for U(p, q)
and Uˆ(p) = U(p, qˆ(p)) for p ∈ [pl, ph]. Also, F (u) = 12 λLλH · u for UR ≤ u ≤ Uh.
Expanding (126) then gives:
pi(p, q) =
(
F (U(p, q)) · λH + F (U(p, qˆ(p))) · λM + λL2
)
· (p− aq) =
λL
2
(
U(p, q) +
λM
λH
U(p, qˆ(p)) + 1
)
· (p− aq) = λL
2
Πh, (135)
where the last equality follows directly from the definitions of U(p, q), λH + λM ,
λL and Πh, Πl, see equations (106), (103) and (102). So, the expected profits are
constant for (p, q) ∈ SC . Next, suppose (p, q) ∈ SB . But then U(p, q) < UR, so no
consumers buy the product and
pi(p, q) = 0 <
λL
2
Πh (136)
Next, suppose (p, q) ∈ SL. This implies UR ≤ U(p, q) ≤ Uh. Let
qu = qˆ(pl), (137)
qb =
1
a
(
pl − (λH + λM )ΠlΠh
λMΠh + λHΠl
)
. (138)
Then it directly follows from the definitions of U(p, q), UR, λH + λM , λL and Πh,
Πl that U(pl, qu) = Uh and U(pl, qb) = UR. Moreover, U(pl, q) is continuous in q
and therefore there exists q∗ such that
U(pl, q∗) = U(p, q). (139)
Consequently,
F (U(p, q)) = F (U(pl, q∗)). (140)
Since p < pl and since Uˆ(p) is decreasing in p, Uˆ(p) ≥ Uˆ(pl). But Uˆ(pl) =
U(pl, qˆ(pl)) = Uh and F (u) = 1 for u ≥ Uh. So,
F (Uˆ(p)) = F (Uˆ(pl)). (141)
Given (139), we can take an iso-utility curve q˜(p) going through points (p, q) and
(pl, q∗). From (111) we have that
q˜′(pl) =
1
a
− 1
a
λM
λM + λH
(pl − aq˜(pl))2
Π2l
(1− aqˆ′(pl)). (142)
As qˆ′(pl) < 1a it follows that q˜
′(pl) < 1a . Utility U(p, q) satisfies assumption 1 and
therefore q˜′′(p) > 0. So, q˜′(p) < 1a for all p ≤ pl. Consequently,
d
dp
Π(p, q˜(p)) = 1− aq˜′(p) > 0 for all p ≤ pl. (143)
As p < pl we then have that
Π(p, q) < Π(pl, q∗). (144)
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Bringing together (140), (141) and (144) and noticing that (pl, q∗) ∈ SC gives:
pi(p, q) =
(
F (U(p, q)) · λH + F (Uˆ(p)) · λM + λL2
)
Π(p, q) <(
F (U(pl, q∗)) · λH + F (Uˆ(pl)) · λM + λL2
)
Π(pl, q∗) =
λL
2
Πh. (145)
Next, suppose (p, q) ∈ SR. This case is analogous to the previous one and we also
get that
pi(p, q) <
λL
2
Πh. (146)
Finally, suppose (p, q) ∈ ST , i.e. U(p, q) > Uh. Given that U(p, q) satisfies assump-
tion 1 there exists q∗ < q such that U(p, q∗) = Uh. As F (u) = 1 for u ≥ Uh we
have that F (U(p, q)) = F (U(p, q∗)). Trivially, Π(p, q) < Π(p, q∗). Therefore,
pi(p, q) =
(
F (U(p, q)) · λH + F (Uˆ(p)) · λM + λL2
)
Π(p, q) <(
F (U(p, q∗)) · λH + F (Uˆ(p)) · λM + λL2
)
Π(p, q∗) = pi(p, q∗). (147)
But (p, q∗) ∈ SL ∪ SC ∪ SR, so pi(p, q∗) ≤ λL2 Πh and pi(p, q) < λL2 Πh. Given that
pi(p, q) = λL2 Πh for (p, q) ∈ SC , that pi(p, q) < λL2 Πh for (p, q) /∈ SC and that
the equilibrium curve qˆ(p) belongs to SC , we have that the profits attain their
maximum over qˆ(p), though not exclusively.17
17It is possible to construct such a utility function that pi(p, q) will attain its unique
maximum over qˆ(p). Roughly speaking, one has to begin with U(p, q) and then make its
iso-utility curves more convex around the equilibrium curve qˆ(p). Obviously, a) will still
hold. When iso-utility curves are bend around qˆ(p), they will coincide at qˆ(p) with the
original iso-utility curves of U(p, q) in their first order approximation, so b) will still hold.
Also, each point from the original iso-utility curve can be viewed as going into the point
on a new iso-utility curve with the same p, same U(p, q) but with strictly higher q (except
for the points of qˆ(p)), so profits pi(p, q) will decrease around the equilibrium curve.
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